The people of Iraq would be voting for a new parliament on November 11, 2025. Political manoeuvring and the seeking of alliances has already started. Considerable attention is being paid to just how Muqtada al Sadr, the scion of one of the most respected families in Iraq, and his Patriotic Shia Current, would fare.
Muqtada al-Sadr, who had announced his withdrawal from politics in June 2022, had said he would boycott the November 2025 elections as he claimed he wanted to “change the faces and save Iraq”. But reportedly he was persuaded by influential Sadrists who wanted to participate in the election to protect remaining Sadrist officials working in state institutions. Muqtada agreed to temporarily suspend his party’s boycott, but retained the option of again withdrawing if events so demanded.
The background to his re-entry into politics this year lies in what happened in the last elections held in 2021 which had resulted in a disappointment for al-Sadr. The results of those elections had initially suggested the possibility that Sadr’s people would emerge as the largest block and be able to form the government.
The Sadrists had been part of all governments since 2006 holding between 30 and 70 seats, under names such as Ahrar Bloc and the Sairoon Alliance. Their best showing was in the 2021 elections when they won 73 seats in the 329 seat parliament. But their aspirations to form the government were sabotaged . Sadr had wanted to form a National Government, through a coalition with the KDP (31 seats), Al-Halbousi’s Taqadum Movement (37 seats), Sunni leader Khamis al-Khanjar and independent MPs to reach a total of 175 seats. The coalition was named Inqath Watan (Saving a Homeland). He wanted to replace the traditional power-sharing agreement, Muhasasa, introduced in 2006 which determined, on ethno -sectarian lines, the structure of the cabinet and allocation of state resources with all parties in parliament receiving executive posts equal to their representation in the government .
In what could be termed a judicial coup, the then President Barham Salih approached the Federal Supreme Court’s which ruled that there had to be a two-thirds quorum to elect a new president, who would name the next prime minister. The Court also raised the number of MPs required to form the government to 220 as against the existing level of 165. –effectively making it impossible for Sadr even with 175 seats to form the government.
The Shia Coordination Framework or SCF formed the government. The alliance included influential, mostly Iran-backed, Shiite political parties and armed factions such as former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition and the Fatah Alliance, which represented many Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions. Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani was named the Prime Minister and quickly won a vote of confidence from parliament for his Cabinet.
The SCF threw out key Sadrist officials, including the Central Bank governor and the governors of Amarah and Najaf and was alleged to have used the courts against al-Sadr’s allies. An example of the Federal Court’s activism was the annulling of the Kurdistan regional government’s 2007 oil and gas law and all energy contracts signed under it.
An angry al Sadr announced in 2022 that he was withdrawing from politics. He decided to leverage street power to demand the dissolution of parliament and new elections. His followers had breached the outer checkpoints of Baghdad’s heavily fortified Green Zone, which housed government headquarters, parliament, and foreign embassies and began an initially peaceful sit-in in the parliament. Clashes took place with the Iranian backed Popular Mobilization Forces.
The protest ended when Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the most revered cleric in Iraq, signalled that he would denounce violence that pitted Shia against Shia . Muqtada al Sadr was also denounced by Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri, a top ranking Iraqi-born Shi'ite cleric who had lived in Iran for decades.
In the run-up to the forthcoming elections, al Sadr had allowed his people to enter into negotiations with his rivals led by Mohammed Shia al Sudani (the current Prime Minister) and his allies now functioning as the Reconstruction and Development Coalition . The Sadrists were seeking support for an extension of the official registration period, something their opponents refused, as they were wary of the Sadrists competing with their members, especially smaller groups running on their own this year. But even as his people were engaged in these discussions, al Sadr ended the talks by posting a handwritten note on hashtag #Boycotters.
In a recent statement al Sadr had made it clear that he wanted to “change the faces and save Iraq”-effectively calling for complete reform of the system. He had also accused the SCF of launching rocket attacks against his allies.
In what was seen as a determined election campaign by al Sadr he had begun to mobilise the shared Shia constituency on issues that his rivals could oppose only at the risk of damaging their own religious identity. Coinciding with the very important Shia religious day of Ashura in 2025, al-Sadr had organised tents, food and refreshments for pilgrims in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square and Nasiriyah’s Haboubi Square, both remembered for the 2019 Tishreen protest movement. Other political factions were unable to replicate al Sadr’s initiative as they feared that they would face virulent opposition from anti-government protesters.
In the elections, the performance of the Sadrists, campaigning as the Patriotic Shia Current, would largely depend on whether they contest the elections as a bloc. But if at the last minute al Sadr decides to boycott the election, they would be forced to fight possibly as independents, which could diminish their chances of scoring well. It could be likely that the current Prime Minister would form the government by including moderate Shia parties and some Sunni and Kurdish partners.
In the region today America has been playing a critical role. Al-Sadr had been very anti-American and his forces had had military confrontations with the US military. In May 2024, he had called for the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to be closed as America was backing Israel in Gaza. But some observers believe that given the Trump administration’s determination to crush Iranian influence in the region , al Sadr might be an acceptable commodity as he is opposed to the Iran backed political and armed groups now in power.
Iraq’s economy is in disarray. The Iraqi government faces an exorbitant domestic spending bill, with public sector salaries, social welfare and pensions adding up to 44.9 trillion Iraqi dinars in the first half of 2025, 99.2 percent of all oil revenues – Iraq’s main source of income – during the same period. Washington has been telling Iraq it should resume oil exports, particularly to Turkey, or face sanctions. The U.S. administration sees Iraqi oil exports as a means of further pressuring Iran by squeezing its oil revenues.
Iran has always played a significant role in the politics of Iraq after Saddam Hussein. But with its economy shattered; the continuing threat of another war with America- backed Israel; and the situation compounded by the continuing sanctions on the country, it is debatable whether Iran would be able to sustain the kind of past support it had provided to the coalition government and armed groups of the SCF.
Iran is also committed to supporting the Houthis of Yemen , who, with Hezbollah badly hit in Lebanon, remain the only somewhat effective anti-Israel proxy for Iran-but they too are being hit by Israel. There is disaffection within Iran with the manner in which the clerical regime has handled affairs -both domestically and internationally-and there is unlikely to be support for any adventure in Iraq with people demanding that the domestic situation be first tackled.
There is also a sense that President Trump is unlikely to back off from his threats to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and that is likely to be Iran’s major priority in the coming months and years rather than trying to establish a pro Iran regime in Iraq.
The late General Qasem Soleimani was the person who had woven the network of Shiite political and armed groups in Iraq. With him removed from the scene, and Iran in dire straits, the possibility of al Sadr being able to achieve his ambition of setting up a national government cannot be ruled out. The Iranian backed political groups were reported to be planning not to contest the November 2025 as a cohesive united group but on separate electoral lists, hoping that would help maximize the coalition’s overall vote share.
But re-unification of the constituents of the Reconstruction and Development Coalition post-election would depend on just how each group is able to perform. There is always a chance that if one or the other constituent does not perform well the coalition could fall apart– possibly leaving the field to Al Sadr.
But even if he cannot form the government, al Sadr could capitalise on his street base and its power as well as the prestige attached to his ancestry to negotiate and seek satisfaction on issues of interest to him-namely a clamping down on militias and more effective state control. Unlike in the period after the 2021 elections, this time he could emerge as the kingmaker and not an impulsive politician departing from the political arena.