The New Face of Communal Violence

NEW DELHI: Over 200 Muslims were driven out of their homes in Atali Village, Ballabgarh, Haryana by a marauding mob who smashed their belongings and torched their homes on May 25. This district is part of the National Capital Region. The reason was ostensibly a dispute over the construction of a mosque for which the Muslims had got clearance from the courts but this was used by communally driven groups to create discord and tensions in the village and eventually drive out the miniscule Muslim community who are too terrified to return to their homes, and are taking shelter in the Ballabgarh police station.

A community elder Hasnu, stayed back to look after the cattle as that is the real livelihood of the poor Muslims in the village. He thought that being an elder in the village he would be safe. He was attacked with axes by four youth, two of whom whose fathers were known to him and whose marriages he had attended. He is battling for his life in hospital. The cattlefeed was destroyed as well on the same day as Hasnu was attacked.

Tensions had escalated in the village for at least five days before the violence. Stone pelting incidents between the two communities were reported. However, little administrative action was taken to restore calm and peace, and prevent the violence that has taken a major toll insofar as the minority community is concerned. They have lost their homes, their belongings, and now it seems their cattle.

The police withdrew the force, according to villagers who do not want to be named, to give sufficient time to the mob to destroy the vehicles and houses. The CPI(M) has also recognised this stating that “the role of the police and civil administration was partisan allowing the perpetrators enough time to do the mischief.” Janhastakshep that brought out the first fact finding report on the incident while the embers were still smouldering also found the role of the police to be dubious, demanding an investigation into the withdrawal of the force that had been posted in the village earlier because of rising tensions.

The CPI(M) has confirmed what the villagers are saying in more clear cut terms with a politburo statement maintaining that “ a BJP activist who aspires to capture the Sarpanch's post in the coming local body elections mobilised his supporters from the village and neighbouring areas and incited them to target the Muslims.” And that “this incident is part of a series of attacks on religious minorities in different parts of the state since the run up to the Lok Sabha elections in Mewat and gathered momentum after the BJP-led government's assumption of power in Haryana. The state government, BJP leaders and the local MLA are trying to force the victims to accept a so called mutually agreed understanding outside the due process of law.”

Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh set the tone just before the Lok Sabha elections that has been repeated over and over again all through the states of North India. The tools are not new, in that the mobilisers are largely Bharatiya Janata Party members and legislators except that now they are more visible and up front; as well as members of new outfits that mushroom overnight and disappear as rapidly. The tactics too are old, in that the violence is preceded by mobilisation, with rumours, lies and half truths spreading through the targeted area with the speed of lightning; heightened polarisation and divisiveness over some local dispute. In Muzaffarnagar for instance local BJP leaders were involved; and the issue around which the propaganda of hate was centred was of eve teasing, in Ballabgarh it was the construction of a mosque.

But the strategy has changed entirely from the communal violence of the past. The effort is to avoid media attention even while escalating the impact of the violence in real terms:

1. Communal violence that was earlier restricted to urban areas has spread to the villages. This is a major shift as with this the anonymity of the attackers has disappeared. The victims now recognise and know the attackers who are fellow villagers. And as any number of victims in Muzaffarnagar said, followed up by Hasnu and others in this latest violence: we were attacked by people we know, we grew up with them, we lived with them.

2. As a result of this the minorities are not willing to return to their homes, as their notions of safety have been completely smashed. As an old woman in a relief camp outside Muzaffarnagar said, “if they (fellow villagers) could do this to us this time, they can do it again and again, where is the security?” Village amity has been destroyed, with communal polarisation overtaking the hitherto harmony and amity of rural life. The attacks are in almost all cases sudden, and more traumatic as these are from within. The fear factor is huge, and in almost all recent incidents the minorities have fled with just the clothes on their back, without even their slippers.

3. The violence has been carefully structured to one, ensure minimal deaths two, large scale displacement and three, little to no possibility of return. This ‘low intensity’ violence is carefully planned, and the attacks ensuring that the deaths remain below media radars. Displacement, however, is huge with the small percentage of Muslims living in Haryana facing insecurity and trauma, with many families reportedly moving out of the homes they have occupied for decades. The attacks generate huge fear, calculated clearly to overwhelm the villagers and prevent their return to their homes.

Earlier the violence was high intensity, and low displacement. Despite the large number of dead in communal violence in the past, the minorities usually returned to their homes as the violence was more or less restricted to the towns, and the attackers were not known to them, having come from other areas. Now the tensions are being whipped up in the villages, amongst the village community itself leading to large scale fear, particularly as efforts by some to return to their homes are thwarted by open threats and intimidation from neighbours.