NEW DELHI: The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJPs) return to power has once again focused attention on India’s close but shadowy strategic, military and intelligence links with Tel Aviv following the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations in January 1992.

Before 1992 there were informal and clandestine security ties between the two. But over the past 15 years, after the BJP assumed power in 1999 and thereafter Tel Aviv has, after Russia and more lately the US, emerged as India’s second largest supplier of military equipment annually valued by armament industry officials at around $ 1 billion.

But despite this rapidly proliferating association that has emerged as Israel’s most significant in Asia, it is one that remains deeply shrouded in secrecy operating in an undefined smoke-and-mirrors environment.

Both sides go to great lengths to play down this strategic Freemasonry for fear of stirring up anti-Jewish sentiments amongst India's substantial Muslim minority and straining ties with Arab states upon whom India depends for nearly 70 per cent of its hydrocarbon imports.

Reciprocal visits to Delhi and Tel Aviv by defence, security and intelligence officers, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) technicians and scientists and armament company executives are kept strictly under wraps. Neither side is willing to comment on the burgeoning military relationship and related commerce.

Before 1992 Israel is reported to have stealthily assisted India with limited military aid and weapons during its brief, albeit disastrous war with China in 1962 with its Chief of Staff, General David Shaltiel visiting Delhi surreptitiously in 1963.

Israel provided similar, albeit limited assistance during subsequent conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.

After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984, India sought Israel's help to upgrade its VIP protection by training and arming the newly raised Special Protection Group and National Security Guard.

These commandoes would travel to Israel via Cyprus- as no direct air links between the two countries existed-but their passports would have no record of their visit to the Jewish state.

Israeli specialists also devised Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's security architecture that broadly continues with minor alterations.

A similar but modified arrangement exists even for ordinary Indian visitors to Israel, their visas stamped on separate pieces of paper so as not to ‘jeopardise’ their travels to other Arab and Muslim countries opposed to the Jewish State.

The disintegration in the early 1990s of the Soviet Union, India's longstanding ally and principal weapons supplier, however came as a major blow to Delhi.

Overnight, crucial supplies of arms and spares for military equipment were interminably delayed and India was compelled to consider diversifying its materiel imports, realising the danger of sole dependence on a single, unreliable source.

The establishment of formal diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao enabled both sides to explore and develop defence and strategic ties on the basis of mutual security and commercial interests.

But it still took another six years and the BJP’s scent to power for Israel’s defence machinery to definitively establish itself in India, second only to the Russians.

India's deteriorating internal security environment through the 1990’s to threatening and, at times alarming levels and the unavailability of modern defence equipment from a splintered Soviet Union, spawned the requirement for updated weaponry and sophisticated systems.

Consequently, India viewed Israel's evolved industrial-military complex favourably and as one that answered many of its defence and security needs.

India’s 11-week long Kargil war in 1999 dramatically pushed Israel’s defence industry to centre stage in the country.

As the seriousness of the conflict unfolded, Israel dug deep into its military reserves to supply India high-end hardware like badly-needed 155 mm ordnance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and laser-guided bombs that contributed in part to vacating the mountainous regions siege and eventually terminating the fighting.

Soon after, Israel began claiming its dues in materiel sales and continues to do so, prospering greatly in the process.

Israeli expertise in manufacturing and upgrading combat aircraft, anti- tactical ballistic missile systems, electronic warfare (EW) and communication equipment and security technology particularly excited India. Alongside, military officials exhibited interest in the Israel Defense Forces' successful warfare strategies and concepts particularly with regard to countering armed insurgencies.

Besides the outright sale of weapons and related force multipliers and retrofitting varied outdated Soviet-Russian era military equipment, Israel’s defence involvement in India currently encompasses limited joint production of conventional weapon systems like ballistic missiles.

Both countries perceive their non-conventional ambitions in the form of ballistic missiles as an integral part of their objective to be regarded as threshold nuclear powers.

Limited technology transfers for EW-related systems to augment network centricity amongst all three Services that remains the Indian military’s long-desired but unrealised goal, intelligence sharing on terrorism issues and Israeli military training assistance to India's Special Forces comprise an integral part of the bilateral strategic and defence relationship.

Israel and India share similar, but un-publicised concerns over threats posed not only by a nuclear-weapon capable and increasingly Islamised Pakistan but the rapid radicalisation of its society and armed forces.

And, as Pakistan struggles under the weight of its regional and tribal tensions there is the apocalyptic fear of its strategic weapons cache falling into the hands of radical Islamic groups, a paranoia shared by many Western countries including Israel’s closest ally, the US.

Revelations in 2004, surrounding the sale of nuclear secrets and centrifuges by Pakistan's atomic scientist A Q Khan to Iran-and to Libya-to help them with their respective weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes, severely alarmed Israel. It further underpinned the need for Tel Aviv and Delhi to cement bilateral military and strategic ties to share information and construct failsafe options to neutralise this threat.

Pakistan's atomic devices, tested in response to rival India's in 1998, are often referred to by many analysts as the "Islamic Bomb", an association that has chilling echoes in Israel.

Itself a "closet" nuclear weapon state, Israel is deeply concerned about possible Pakistani atomic proliferation to Iran- presently facing international inquisition over its reportedly covert strategic weapons programme- and the wider, anti-Zionist Muslim world.

It is also important to grasp the Israeli establishments argument that like itself, Delhi is surrounded by hostile neighbours and hence a nation under "siege" which needs desperately to strengthen and bolster its security apparatus.

Furthermore, Israel markets itself as a country offering a wide range of battle-tested, new and upgraded materiel, in many cases of US origin and one that can effortlessly facilitate transfers that are largely not subject to international arms control regimes. Over years, this reasoning found an echo in Delhi’s political and strategic circles. ENDS