Lessons For Despots From The History of India
Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb's court

There are moments in India’s historic past when people rise above distinctions and politics of caste, class and creed, when extreme politics of any kind are summarily rejected, and when inclusive politics of justice for all prevails against all odds. Not for nothing has the country rejected many a Khilji or Tughluq despot, and celebrated the sacrifice of numerous selfless jawans, shahids, sants as well as the Mahatma.
Caste and religion remain important aspects of social reality – whether in private or public – with their own context-specific rationality, with a lot of emotions and sentiments involved. Irresponsible politicians have for long exploited caste-based stratifications and injustices as well as religious or sectarian divides, sweeping real grievances of the people under the carpet. Thus, governments come and go and the problems remain; indeed, multiply and deteriorate. A more transparent and accountable system enabling inclusive politics and equitable economic policy, with level-playing field for everyone and some concern for the poor and the downtrodden (irrespective of caste or religion), will do a lot of good. For a change, politics on these lines are now possible, hoping that things will change for the better, with or without a jhadu.
Historians and political theorists have repeatedly highlighted the value of India’s long tradition of broad-based models of governance, which ensured considerable political stability on a large Sub-continental scale, highly vibrant economy with International balance of payments heavily loaded in India’s favour, and tolerance for a wide variety of religious practices and ethnic diversities. It was possible to create and maintain a system where the law of the land and the policies of the government would not discriminate in the name of religion or caste-based hierarchies.
Looking at these questions in the context of medieval India, at the height of his power, Akbar (ruled 1556-1605) called for peace with all and ensured that, even if he might have used religion for justification of his conquests and political aggrandisement’s, as a ruler he was not going to succumb to any pressure from leaders of various religious groups attempting to pull down each other and use political power to forcibly convert the people to their folds. The emperor succeeded in neutralizing the men of religions – self-styled representatives of a variety of Islamic political positions, Christians, Zoroastrians, Jainas as well as a number of Hindu Gurus – giving them space to spell out the fundamentals of their faiths, and yet making them realize that they were wasting their time; the emperor was not going to privilege any one group at the cost of the others.
Someone like Aurangzeb (ruled 1658-1707), on the other hand, kept invoking a narrow sectarian interpretation of Islam to not only justify his usurpation of power in the most violent manner possible but also to handle the problems of governance, especially the question of a failing economy. In sum, he was desperately resorting to irrational and discriminatory kind of political principles, which excluded a whole range of people, Hindus and Muslims alike. Surely, if Akbar were ruling in the latter half of the seventeenth century instead of Aurangzeb and faced with the same kinds of problems – ethnic, religious, or the economic crisis for that matter – he would have handled the situation in a most ruthless manner and would yet appear legitimate, for his model of governance was inclusive. His great grandson’s failure to pursue this approach not only led to his own peril – at least in terms of the historical memory of injustices under him – but also provoked all-round anxieties and violence. The most shocking case of mob violence was desecration of the tomb of Akbar himself, for no fault of his, but which testified to the failure of the State.
A third and more whimsical approach to politics and government is what is identified as the Tughluq style in all its vanity and arrogance. Though perhaps a well-meaning Sultan with exposure as a prince to the blessings of a leading Chishti stalwart Nizam-ud-Din Auliya and association with intellectuals such as Ziya-ud-Din Barani (who is known in posterity for his fine works of history and political ideas – Tarikh-i-Firuzshahi and Fatawa-i-Jahandari), Muhammad Tughluq (ruled 1325-51) sounded arbitrary, authoritarian and at times completely ridiculous. Like most hardworking dictators who thought they had the panacea for all the problems facing the world and can single-handedly change the map of the world, he would suppress any dissent in a brutal manner, not even listening to any sane advice from people who were otherwise his well-wishers. Economy was once again at the root of the problems which he miserably failed to handle, with an otherwise significant, perhaps ahead of his time, move to introduce token currency turning into a massive scandal. When Muhammad Tughluq’s rule came to an end in the middle of an arduous political campaign, Ziya-ud-Din Barani wrote, both the cruel Sultan and the hapless public were relieved from each other.
Perhaps, these examples from the past can serve as important lessons for those in power and authority in modern times. No one expects the rulers to work a miracle or do something great; they are not expected to be leading an austere life of a saint either. On the other hand, no one wants to live on charity. Just a bit of insaaf in the redistribution of power will go a long way.



