Goof Ups in Ladakh

The book ‘Four Star Destiny’, authored by former Army Chief General MM Naravane has resurfaced with a bang after a brief hiatus in 2023, when excerpts of the book were released in the media.

Saying that the book is “unpublished” is wrong because it was published. The central government stopped its online “release” but some copies were passed on – in the same way the government guards the Henderson Brooke Report, but a few copies are out.

Excerpts of the book were covered in these columns in December 2023 (https://www.thecitizen.in/opinion/undersoldiers-unraveled-98331):the Army Chief had firm orders not to fire on the PLA; when he sought orders with PLA tanks and troops advancing, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said he had spoken to the Prime Minister, and “Jo ucchit samjho woh karo” (do as you deem fit); when General Naravane conveyed enemy tanks and troops coming within 500m, the Defence Minister, External Affairs Minister (EAM), the National Security Advisor and the Chief of Defence Staff didn’t respond as to how he should deal with this criticality.

This pusillanimous response was an abdication of responsibility that would help place the total blame on the Army if anything went wrong. Rajnath Singh, who rubbished the book in Parliament, calling it all lies, is perhaps unaware that the forward of the book was written by General VK Singh on November 23, 2023, who was then the Minister of State (MoS) for Civil Aviation (now Governor of Mizoram). Gen VK Singh didn’t find anything wrong in the book.

PLA troops/tanks approaching Rechin La even fired a shot towards theIndian troops, as the Chinese were surprised with India surreptitiously occupying Kailash Range (including Rechin La); giving India enormous strategic advantage - directly overlooking PLA’s Moldo Garrison and the Spanggur Gap.

But when the government suddenly ordered a vacation of the Kailash Range, ‘yes men’ on TV argued it wasn’t even tactically important. The NSA, EAM and Defence Minister failed to explain how Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi bullied them into vacating this range, that too, without simultaneous Chinese withdrawal from Depsang. It was simply said Depsang will be discussed later.

The hubris that China allowed patrolling by India in Depsang after two years hides the following: Indian patrols can’t be vehicle-borne; both sides can inform each other on the hotlines minimum 24 hours before the patrol; only one patrolling point can be visited in a month by both sides.

On the north bank of Pangong Tso, India is left with one solitary post between Fingers 2 and 3, but we cannot patrol eastwards as before, while PLA has positioned tanks at Finger 10 and the metalled road linking it to Finger 3 is intact.

The book reveals the military was not consulted about the Agnipath scheme and its mass imposition came as a bombshell. This seems to be another reason why the government stopped the book release. A critical manpower situation was created by stopping regular recruitment for two years and Rajnath Singh told Parliament that 168 organizations were consulted before imposing the scheme on the 1.4 million military; but not on the 2.16 million police, CAPF and special police.

Singh held an eight-hour meeting at his residence after the Galwan clash before going to meet the Prime Minister. China posted videoclips of Galwan in the media but India couldn’t post any; after videos emerged of stone-pelting between Indian and Chinese troops near Pangong Tso (August 2017), and another of a brawl in North Sikkim, the Army was ordered to stop recording videos.

Salman Khan’s movie ‘The Galwan Clash’ is being released, which China has condemned terming it a one-sided version, and the Defence Minister will probably green-flag the first tourist group to Galwan.

But other goof ups also occurred in Ladakh, which we should acknowledge, if we want to draw lessons from them.

China had developed a new road 5-km short of Galwan, defiladed from the Indian side by the ridgeline. But how come our external intelligence had no inkling – have we progressed beyond the 1999 surprise in Kargil?

PLA Mechanised Divisions were exercising in Aksai Chin for some time. Neither was their intention appreciated, not their move forward monitored – why? Later, it was inserted in the media. We knew they could enter Eastern Ladakh in 24-36 hours, but never expected them to do so – sic.

China branded India “aggressor” because we lacked the courage to call China so from day one; obviously to cover up ground realities. That gave China an upper-hand straightaway and by vacating the Kailash Range, we handed over all the aces to China at the bargaining table.

The ITBP was in the show-window having different channels of reporting and command and control under the home ministry; not under command of the Army. This continues to-date.

It is amazing to see how the bogey of “escalation” is being played up by ‘yes men”, including veterans, to deflect from India’s response – using artillery at PLA tanks in Rechin La would have resulted in a nuclear exchange. But if PLA had fired a shot at us (to test our nerves) why could we not fire 5-10 rounds (not artillery) in response?

In 1967, when we gave a bloody nose to the PLA at Nathu La and the Chinese took 10 days to return to that location, we were not even a nuclear power. In 1987, when the Chinese were forced to withdraw from Sumdorong Chu, we were a nuclear power, but occupied higher ground through Op ‘Chequerboard’.

The fact is after 1962, wherever India stood its ground, the Chinese fell back.

In the instant case, we had no idea of advancing Chinese mechanized divisions, and surrendered the commanding heights of the Kailash range.

In closed door discussions, foreign participants have been saying that China could use tactical nukes against India in a future war, in order to gain territory it views as strategically important. How would India respond?

Finally, it is evident that China will never allow India to become a permanent UNSC member with veto power, unless it is on Chinese terms .Readers can visualize what these terms could be. But is this Chinese stance because of India’s demonstrated pusillanimity?

Lt. General Prakash Katoch is an Indian Army veteran. The views expressed here are the writer’s own.